Is this Mexico's tactical blueprint for the World Cup?

Data and graphics from CONCACAF.com, photo from Goal.com.

Thanks to four Raúl Jiménez goals, and two gifts from Panama, Mexico won the CONCACAF Nations League for the first time. El Tri didn’t dominate their matches, with a total of 2.99 xG for and 2.0 against, but the victories may give confidence to Vasco Aguirre and Rafa Márquez, to continue with the same tactical ideas on route to the World Cup. Here are the five tactical concepts that stood-out most to me during the games against Canada and Panama.

Jiménez and Giménez

Without being able to sign players, national team coaches have limitations when building their team, and face a key question. Do they create a game model first, and then choose the right players for the system, perhaps resulting in some of the most talented options being left out, or do they start with the best players, and then find a structure to fit them into. In attack, Vasco and Rafa have opted for the latter.

Whilst Raúl Jiménez and Santiago Giménez have played the majority of their careers as the only number nine, their differing profiles suggest that they can work together. Jiménez has massively developed his off-ball movement to receive more touches, connect attacks, and begin transitions. He didn’t just stand-out for his goals, but also his overall play, and ability to receive progressive passes. Santi didn’t make a great impact over the two matches, but his positioning did pin back defenders to create more space for Raúl, and against Panama he showed an improved understanding of when to rotate with his strike-partner and move towards the right-side.

Doubt: Could Julián Quiñones be a better option than Santi up-front in some matches? Julián is more similar to Raúl, given his movement and ball retention, but he may be able to create a more fluid, flexible attack, and his strength in counter-attacks would be useful against stronger sides.

Flexibility between a back-four and back-five

Mexico used a 4-4-2 on paper in both matches, but fluctuated between their starting formation and a 3-4-3 or 5-3-2 in different game moments. Many head coaches ask for defensive work from a wide player to cover movements from opposition full-backs/wing-backs, and Roberto “Piojo” Alvarado was selected to play in this role.

Mexico’s 4-4-2 mid-block

Piojo was constantly aware of any threats, dropping-in to create a back-five and cover the space in the seam between full-back and centre-back, in both matches. Alvarado showed the work-rate and game intelligence to defend effectively, not just covering the wide areas, but also marking in the right-half-space when Israel Reyes jumped to press out wide. For example, here Reyes is pressing Alphonso Davies to prevent his progression, whilst Piojo marks Jonathan Osorio in the half-space.

We also saw flexibility in-possession, especially against Panama, who gave Mexico more time to build-up. Reyes often created a back-three alongside the two centre-backs, and Piojo occupied the right-wing.

Doubt: Alvarado understood the defensive role well, and could also create threats going forwards against Panama. However, given his average performances in Liga MX, the need to occupy the right-wing and cross with his right-foot at times, plus the defensive work, would a natural wing-back option be best? Or the right-footed César Huerta?

Left-winger playing centrally

Mexico’s flexibility between structures also impacted the left-side. Huerta or Alexis Vega had to occupy central zones, both with and without the ball, whilst Jesús Gallardo moved-up the left-wing.

Mexico’s 3-4-3 structure with Huerta inside

Aguirre started with Vega against Canada and “Chino” versus Panama, but both had limited impacts, were subbed-off at the first opportunity, and only managed 21 touches. Vega couldn’t exploit his connection with Gallardo, and had to do more defensive work against Canada, whilst Huerta isn’t as effective between the lines.

Mexico’s key passes and successful crosses vs Panama, the majority coming from the right-side

Doubt: Does the role force both players into central positions where they aren’t as effective? Vega often creates dangerous situations when he can start wide and move inside, whilst Chino is threatening when attacking the space behind a full-back.

Edson’s freedom in a double-pivot

Recently, Edson Álvarez has played most of his games for the national team as the deepest-lying midfielder, or the pivot, with two midfielders in-front. The decision to play with two up-front didn’t only adjust the attacking idea, but also Edson’s role.

In a double-pivot against Panama, Álvarez had more freedom than Luis Romo and Luis Chávez to move forwards, especially in the second-half.

Edson Álvarez’s heat map during the second-half vs Panama

Edson’s positioning and aggression in the second-half helped to improve Mexico’s high press, and Álvarez was the leader in duels won during the match, with 13. Also, Edson played a part in a few dangerous attacks, connecting on the right-side and at times arriving in the box.

Doubt: Two of the best Mexican performances in Liga MX this season, Érick Sánchez and Marcel Ruíz, weren’t called-up by Aguirre. Does Vasco lack confidence in their defensive abilities in a double-pivot, in international football? Liga MX displays suggest that both players could be effective in this box-to-box role, and may provide more creativity in attack, especially against weaker opposition.

Game state determines the mentality

In both matches, Mexico took an early lead, and sat-back. El Tri had 43% possession versus Canada and just 33% during the first-half of the final against Panama.

After Adelberto Carrasquilla’s penalty, Mexico came-out with a completely different mentality during the second-half. Vasco’s side had just 61% of the possession, whilst Edson and full-back/centre-back Israel Reyes were given more freedom to join the attack, with Reyes making underlapping runs to create problems for Panama’s back-five.

Cumulative xG (or the xG race chart) in both games. In the blue zones, after Mexico scored, there was very little attacking threat created. Mexico created more shots in the second-half against Panama, but with few clear, high-quality chances.

Doubt: It’s important that Mexico can adapt, defender and hold-out during spells of World Cup matches against stronger opponents, and their ability to switch mentalities was impressive. However, Mexico will have to beat at least one weaker opponent to make it through the group stage in 2026. El Tri allowed Panama to take the initiative, instead of looking for a second goal, and it nearly cost them, only a gift of a penalty prevented the match from going to extra-time.

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